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Abstract
Even in the presence of negative information, healthy human beings display an optimistic tendency when thinking of past
success and future chances, giving a positive bias to everyday’s cognition. The tendency to actively select positive thoughts
suggests the existence of a mechanism to exclude negative content, raising the issue of its dependence on mechanisms like
those of effortful control. Using perfusion imaging, we examined how brain activations differed according to whether
participants were left to prefer positive thoughts spontaneously, or followed an explicit instruction to the same effect,
finding a widespread dissociation of brain perfusion patterns. Under spontaneous processing of emotional material,
recruitment of areas associated with effortful attention, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, was reduced relative to
instructed avoidance of negative material (F1,58=26.24, p=0.047, corrected). Under spontaneous avoidance perfusion
increments were observed in several areas that were deactivated by the task, including the perigenual medial prefrontal
cortex. Furthermore, individual differences in executive capacity were not associated with positive bias. These findings
suggest that spontaneous positive cognitive emotion regulation in health may result from processes that, while actively
suppressing emotionally salient information, differ from those associated with effortful and directed control.
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Introduction
An aspect of healthy mental functioning is the positive
connotation of thoughts arising spontaneously or occasioned by
external stimuli, as is demonstrated by the reversal of this positive
bias in depression [1] and the protective effect of optimism for
mental and physical health [2]. Understanding the nature of this
tendency is an important task for shedding light on the processes at
the basis of mood maintenance and disorders of affect.
Because it is active even if negative stimuli are present [3], the
tendency to select positive thoughts suggests the existence of a
regulatory mechanism to exclude negative content. There are
clear instances in which avoiding negative cognitions follows an
intentional, effortful strategy, as when one tries to put worries to
rest [4] or explicitly reappraises stimuli in a more favourable light
[5]. In these situations, effortful control and reflective reasoning
are responsible for keeping negative thoughts at bay. This
conclusion is consistent with attributing to cognitive control
processes, like those underlying voluntary effort, a decisive role in
determining the direction of thoughts and maintaining a positive
mood [6–7], and with modelling psychiatric disorders as involving
the failure of such control [8–11]. These accounts are based on the
insight of neuroimaging studies of emotion investigating the effect
of the presence of emotional information while its role as target or
distracter is defined by an explicit instruction or the task. By
focusing on the capacity of top-down control processes to second
or resist the attentional pull of emotional stimuli, these studies have
demonstrated the crucial role played in this respect by the
prefrontal cortex [5,12–15].
Outside the field of emotion regulation, however, examples of
positive bias are known that appear to arise automatically when
evaluating choices or risks [16–17]. Here, bias does not emerge
from the use of reflective strategies, but is a spontaneous and
natural response. In these situations, positive bias may be
understood as an ‘affect heuristic’ based on processes that differ
in kind from those of reflective reasoning [18–19]. While this field
of inquiry has developed separately from that of the neurobiology
of emotion, it potentially provides an alternative account of how
positive bias may emerge in everyday life, and by implication, of
how emotion regulation may be achieved without resorting to
cognitive control [20]. Indeed, theorists of emotion regulation
have recently turned their attention to the possible role of
‘automatic’ forms of emotion regulation [21], and emphasized the
importance of mapping its possibly distinct neural substrate [22].
However, notwithstanding their theoretical importance, the
empirical investigation of automatic emotion regulation has so
far remained elusive.
Positive bias in cognitions is demonstrable by asking participants
to assemble sentences from a set of scrambled words (scrambled
sentences task). When legal sentences with different meanings are
possible given the words in the set, a choice is implicitly made
among the alternative solutions to the task. For example, ‘‘bright
the very dismal looks future’’ may be unscrambled to form a
negative thought, ‘‘the future looks very dismal,’’ or a positive
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sentences have an affective meaning, as in this example, healthy
participants are remarkably selective and spontaneously tend to
avoid the pessimistic version, forming 70–80% positive sentences
even if the existence of emotional words is not mentioned in the
explanation of the task [3]. Crucially, this occurs even if negative
words are emotionally more salient than positive words, showing
that a mechanism must actively steer thoughts towards optimism.
If the spontaneous responses in this task were passively determined
by the automatic attention-grabbing emotional salience of the
input [23–24], participants would form more negative than
positive sentences, not less. In depression research, where the
scrambled sentences task is established, is has been shown that in
contrast to the positive bias of health participants individuals
suffering from major depression show a pronounced negative bias
and form by far more negative sentences [25–26].
When applied to the scrambled sentences task, the effortful
control and the affect heuristic views provide alternative accounts
of the avoidance of negative sentences in healthy individuals,
corresponding to the two fundamentally different hypotheses on
how emotion may be integrated into the cognitive control
architecture. In the effortful control account, emotional informa-
tion in the presented words is first flagged as relevant by processes
appraising emotional material in the input channel, which
subsequently trigger the intervention of executive attentional
processes configured so as to intentionally exclude negative
material in the chosen response [4–5,27–28]. Under the affective
heuristic hypothesis, in contrast, the spontaneous preference for
positive sentences depends on processes determining response that
are automatic in the sense of being active regardless of the subject’s
intentions, and do not require effort or the supervision of executive
attention [20,29–31]. Hence, the scrambled sentences task offers
the opportunity to empirically investigate the nature of mecha-
nisms steering thoughts and emotional response spontaneously and
test the differing predictions of the effortful and affect heuristic
models.
We undertook a direct comparison of spontaneous and
intentional avoidance of negative content in the scrambled
sentences task using a neuroimaging technique that allows
quantitative estimation of perfusion levels (continuous arterial spin
labelling, CASL [32–33]). After a resting baseline of 8 min,
participants were asked to unscramble sentences in homogeneous
task blocks. The sentences to be formed belonged in two
conditions: neutral (no emotional content in the possible sentences),
and emotional (in each trial, the alternative formed sentences could
be positive or negative). Negative words were significantly more
arousing than positive words (see Methods for details). Further-
more, the instruction varied across participants. A first group was
simply told to form grammatically correct sentences, eliciting the
spontaneous avoidance of the negative alternative (spontaneous
group); a second group, in contrast, was explicitly instructed to
avoid forming negative sentences (instructed group). Both groups
formed sentences under the neutral control and affective
condition. We reasoned that, if the effortful control account is
correct, a recruitment of brain areas associated with executive
processes must be observed in both the spontaneous and instructed
groups when confronted with emotional ambiguous material, since
avoiding negative sentences would place similar increased
demands on the executive attentional network relative to the
neutral condition, where sentence formation is unconstrained [34].
By contrast, the affective heuristic account predicts dissimilar
perfusion patterns in the spontaneous and instructed groups, in
accordance with the expected different nature of processes
involved in effortful and spontaneous response elaboration.
Furthermore, if the natural heuristic account is correct, areas
specifically activated by the exposure to emotional material in the
spontaneous group should provide information about the brain
networks associated with spontaneous avoidance of negative
content.
To characterize further the nature of avoidance of negative
sentences, we measured the working memory capacity (WMC) of
participants using a complex memory span test (OSPAN [35]).
Working memory capacity is the psychometric notion that comes
closest to the concept of central executive [36]. Increased success
in voluntary avoidance of negative content in individuals with
higher working memory capacity has been shown in a previous
study of instructed avoidance [37]. We reasoned that, if the
effortful control hypothesis is correct, participants are expected to
rely on executive processes to exclude negative material even
without explicit instructions. In this case, individual differences in
working memory capacity must have an effect on the degree of
success in avoiding negative outcomes even in the spontaneous
condition. No such effect is predicted by the affective heuristic
model, because cognitive capacity is not associated with the
performance of heuristic strategies [38–39]. We also administered
the scrambled sentences task before scanning in the original paper
and pencil form [3] to allow participants to practice the task, and
reliably verify the existence of the positive bias in participants. The
two groups, spontaneous and instructed, were matched for age,
sex, OSPAN scores, and depressiveness.
By contrasting spontaneous and voluntary forms of avoidance of
negative content, we show that areas associated with executive
control are recruited less under spontaneous response. Further-
more, we provide evidence for the dissociation between the neural
substrates of spontaneous and voluntary emotion regulation. We
anticipate that the identification of these spontaneous mechanisms
of emotion regulation will improve our understanding of
psychiatric disorders of affect.
Results
Behavioural Data
As anticipated, participants avoided negative sentences in the
spontaneous group (25% negative sentences, logistic regression
z=211, p,0.001) as well as in the instructed group (0.5%
negative sentences). In the spontaneous group, depressiveness
scores were associated with rates of negative sentences (t=3.17,
p=0.004), even if these scores were all low and in the normal
range. In contrast with the prediction of the effortful control
hypothesis, the association between WMC and avoidance of
negative sentences in the spontaneous group was not significant
(logistic regression, z=21.2, p=0.22). However, WMC scores did
predict the proportion of well-formed sentences (negative or
positive) formed in the task (z=3.8, p,0.001), both in the
spontaneous (z=3.5) and in the instructed group (z=2.7). Rates of
negative sentences formed during scanning and in the pre-scan test
were highly correlated across subjects (Spearman’s rank correla-
tion r=0.48, p,0.001).
Neuroimaging Results
To verify that the perfusion technique was successful, and
identify areas involved in the task, we first contrasted the
conditions in which subjects were forming sentences, irrespective
of valence (emotional or neutral) and instruction (explicit
instruction or spontaneous avoidance of negative sentences),
against the baseline perfusion at rest. This preliminary contrast
revealed the activation of areas known to be involved in attentional
and linguistic processing [40], such as posterior parietal, dorsal
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superiorly towards the precentral sulcus (frontal eye fields, FEFs),
and the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex/anterior insula
(VLPFC/AI). Also deactivations relative to the baseline were
found that replicated well-known observations in the field
comparing the default mode with the initiation of cognitive
processes [41–48], and involved the posterior and ventral
cingulate, posterior insula and the adjacent parietal operculum
and superior temporal gyrus, and a band extending from the
inferior parietal posteriorly to the inferior temporal gyrus
anteriorly (Figure 1 and Supporting Table S1 in the information
available online).
To test for the dissociation predicted by the affect heuristic
hypothesis, we looked for an interaction between sentence
condition (emotional vs. neutral) and instruction (explicit instruc-
tion vs. spontaneous avoidance of negative sentences), using the
areas of task activation and deactivation as an interpretive guide
(Figure 2A and Supporting Table S2 in the online information).
This interaction was significant in the most dorsal portion of the
DLPFC cluster activated by the task (Figure 2A), reaching its peak
in the right FEF, Brodmann area 6 (BA6, x, y, z: 44, 4, 52,
F1,58=26.24, p=0.047, corrected at voxel level for the whole
volume). Further analysis revealed that the interaction was due to
reduced perfusion in the emotional relative to the neutral
condition in spontaneous participants (x, y, z: 44, 4, 52,
t=25.67, p=0.030, corrected), while in instructed participants
perfusion increased slightly (x, y, z: 48, 0, 52; t=2.23, p=0.017;
see Figure 3). In the left DLPFC/FEF, a similar pattern was
observed, even if it failed to reach significance at corrected levels
(interaction, x, y, z: 234, 24, 54, F1,58=19.05, p,0.001; simple
effect in spontaneous participants, x, y, z: 236, 22, 54, t=24.55,
p,0.001; in instructed participants, x, y, z: 240, 212, 54, t=2.65,
p=0.007, all significance levels uncorrected). This same interac-
tion extended posteriorly on the left to the superior parietal areas
activated by the task (Figure 3).
To further investigate the mechanism of spontaneous control we
undertook an exploratory analysis of changes in perfusion in the
spontaneous group, contrasting exposure to emotional with
neutral material, and using the areas of task activation and
deactivation detected by perfusion imaging to aid interpretation
(Figure 2B and Supporting Table S3 online). This contrast
revealed perfusion increases (red/yellow), involving the superior
Figure 1. Main task perfusion changes. Changes in brain perfusion in the sentences building task, irrespective of emotional valence or
instruction, overlaid by ‘fiducial mapping’ on an atlas of cortical surface based on 12 individuals (top row) and on the corresponding flat map (bottom
row). Voxel-level corrected activations relative to the resting baseline are displayed in yellow/orange, deactivations in blue/green (p#0.05). In shades
of gray are shown the activations and deactivations (+/2) at uncorrected significance levels (p#0.05). DLPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; VLPFC:
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; SMG: supramarginal gyrus; MPFC/vACC: medial prefrontal cortex (pregenual) and ventral anterior cingulate cortex;
dACC: dorsal anterior cingulate; PC: posterior cingulate; ant, post: anterior, posterior directions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015454.g001
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28, BA43, t=4.73, p,0.001), the perigenual medial prefrontal
cortex (perigenual MPFC, x, y, z: 28, 38, 6, t=3.20, p=0.002,
Figure 4), and the inferior temporal gyrus (ITG, x, y, z: 254, 222,
226, BA 20, t=3.08, p=0.002, all significance levels uncorrect-
ed). These activations were more marked in the spontaneous than
in the instructed group, as these same areas appear in the
interaction between groups and condition in Figures 2A (in yellow)
and 4 (perigenual MPFC, x, y, z: 28, 38, 6, F1,58=9.05
[t=23.01], p=0.004; insula/prefrontal operculum, x, y, z: 264,
220, 30, F1,58=10.20 [t=23.19], p=0.002; ITG, x, y, z: 250,
224, 222, F1,58=8.23 [t=22.87], p=0.006, all uncorrected).
Furthermore, these activations were prevalently localized to areas
that were deactivated by the main task (to be as inclusive as
possible in defining these areas, and avoid missing small task
activations, in Figure 2 the display threshold was kept low). The
deactivation was significant in the superior temporal/supramar-
ginal gyrus (x, y, z: 258, 230, 20, t=25.47, p=0.01, corrected for
the whole volume), and present as a trend in the perigenual MPFC
(x, y, z: 0, 30, 6, t=23.98, p,0.001, uncorrected).
The left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) was an
exception to this pattern (Figure 5). This area and parts of the
adjacent anterior insula were both more active in the task as whole
(x, y, z: 248, 22, 210, t=5.37, p=0.01, corrected for the whole
volume), and when the spontaneous group was exposed to
emotional material (x, y, z: 256, 28, 22, t=3.08, p=0.002; x, y,
z: 248, 22, 210, t=2.59, p=0.006, all uncorrected). Analysis of
the interaction of these areas indicated that these small activations
were slightly larger in the spontaneous group (x, y, z: 255, 28, 23,
F1,58=4.36 [t=22.09], p=0.04, uncorrected; x, y, z: 242, 24,
210, F1,58=6.07 [t=22.46], p=0.017, uncorrected). A similar
pattern was present on the right (x, y, z: 32, 20, 222, t=2.72,
p=0.004, uncorrected; interaction, F1,58=9.98 [t=23.16],
p=0.003, uncorrected).
Outside the dorsal attentional network, instructed participants
showed increased perfusion levels in the presence of emotional
Figure 2. Neuroimaging of controlled and spontaneous avoidance of negative content. ‘Fiducial mapping’ of contrast effects on the
inflated cortical surface (top row) and on the corresponding flat map (bottom row) for the left hemisphere is shown. In both panels, shades of gray
indicate the same areas activated or deactivated by the task at uncorrected significance levels (as detected by a comparison with the baseline
condition) as in Figure 1. A: cortical projection rendering of the emotional valence6instruction interaction. In red/yellow are areas following the
pattern in DLPFC/FEF indicating more perfusion in the instructed relative to the spontaneous group when processing emotional information. In blue
are areas in which the interaction went in the opposite direction. B: fiducial mapping of the contrast emotional vs. neutral in the spontaneous group
only. The largest areas of increased perfusion during exposure to emotional words were located in or near areas deactivated by the main task (MPFC/
vACC, PC, SMG). To be as inclusive as possible (see text for rationale), statistical maps were thresholded at p#0.05, uncorrected. Abbreviations as in
Figure 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015454.g002
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the cuneus, precuneus and posterior cingulate (Figure 4 and
Supporting Table S4 online).
Discussion
Two independent sets of findings presented here support the
notion that spontaneous avoidance of negative content reflected
mechanisms distinct from explicit control, as predicted by the
affect heuristic model of spontaneous avoidance. Firstly, when
spontaneously avoiding negative sentences, there was less
recruitment of executive attentional areas when exposed to
emotional ambiguous material (where avoidance of negative
content occurred) than to neutral material (in which no avoidance
was required). In contrast, instructed avoidance increased this
recruitment, most notably in DLPFC/FEF, an area involved in
effortful attending to the visual environment in conformance to
current goals and expectations [49–50]. This pattern speaks
against attributing spontaneous avoidance to less systematic or
intense recruitment of effortful control processes (irrespective of
how erratic and weak), for in this case perfusion in areas associated
with executive control would still have been slightly increased or
unchanged under spontaneous avoidance, not decreased. For the
same reason, this pattern cannot be explained by the much greater
efficiency of instructed avoidance.
Secondly, working memory capacity had little influence on the
rate of the spontaneous avoidance of negative sentences. This was
not due to the failure of working memory capacity scores to
account for variance in performance, since working memory
capacity was associated with the number of sentences formed
overall. Hence, these scores were associated with the participants’
success in carrying out the task deliberately attended to, but not
their success in the spontaneous avoidance of negative sentences.
Neuroimaging studies of control of emotional content have
investigated the effect of the presence of emotional information while
its role as target or distractor is defined by an explicit instruction
[5,12–15]. In the presence of an explicit instruction, however,
strategies of emotional control due to spontaneous mechanisms
cannot be identified. The evidence presented here that spontaneous
mechanisms of regulation are distinct from those dependent on
effortful control opens a new venue of inquiry about the mechanisms
in which the healthy propensity for optimism is altered.
Figure 3. Voluntary and spontaneous regulation in the dorsal network. A: Displayed perfusion values are bilateral averages of the signal in
the DLPFC/FEF cluster in BA6. To avoid selection bias, the cluster was defined from the contrast sentence formation vs. baseline, irrespective of
valence or instruction, not from the interaction contrast, using the threshold p#0.05, voxel-level corrected. B: Mean blood flow increases relative to
baseline in the spontaneous (left half) and the instructed condition (right half). Spontaneous avoidance, triggered by the presence of emotional
words, is associated with less recruitment of this control area. Under instructed avoidance, in contrast, perfusion increased (interaction: F1,57=11.59,
p=0.001). This increase was small, but participants were seconding a natural tendency, not opposing a prepotent response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015454.g003
Figure 4. Voluntary and spontaneous regulation in the medial wall. Contrast emotional vs. neutral in the instructed and spontaneous group
separately (left), and in the interaction (right) in the medial wall (x=27 mm), overlaid on a standard template brain. In the interaction, in light blue
are increases of perfusion due to the presence of emotional words in the spontaneous group relative to the instructed group. PC: precuneus/
posterior cingulate; MPFC: perigenual medial prefrontal cortex. Maps of t values were thresholded for illustration purposes at p#0.05, uncorrected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015454.g004
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of whether the effortful control hypothesis adequately accounts for
spontaneous forms of emotion regulation, it is natural to query the
data about the pattern of changes induced by emotional material
in the spontaneous group, in view of the information it may
provide on how a model of spontaneous regulation may look like.
While many of the changes observed in the spontaneous group
may have been induced by the presence of emotional stimuli as
such, a specific mechanism must have been active to influence the
direction of thoughts without recurring to voluntary control.
Remarkably, in the spontaneous group very little increased
recruitment induced by the presence of emotional words was
present in the areas activated by the task, especially compared to
the extent of activation of the dorsal attentional network associated
with the explicit instruction.
Two systems emerged in this study as candidate neural
correlates of response modulation in spontaneous avoidance.
The first was given by the piece-meal reversal of the typical pattern
of activations and deactivations associated with focussed execution
of a task relative to an unconstrained resting baseline [41,51–52],
which characterized the response to emotional material in the
spontaneous group, and involved less recruitment of dorsal
attentional areas. Notably, this partial reversal included the
perigenual MPFC, which constitutes the ‘affective’ part of medial
prefrontal cortex [53] and is often involved in tasks requiring
handling emotional stimuli [12,54–55], decisions based on
heuristics [56], or imagining the future [57–58]. The subgenual
MPFC, in particular, has been implicated in depression [59–60].
The second were theareas inVLPFC that were more recruitedin
the presence of emotional material also during spontaneous control,
and in this respect dissociated from more dorsal areas in the
prefrontal cortex. This dissociation parallels the known functional
dissociation of their right-hemisphere homologues in studies of
spatial attention, in which dorsal areas implement voluntary and
effortful attentional process, while a ventral network is involved in
attentional reorienting according to behavioural relevance and
Figure 5. Voluntary and spontaneous regulation in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC). Contrast emotional vs. neutral in the
instructed and spontaneous group separately (top and middle), and in the interaction (bottom) in a transversal slice across the prefrontal cortex
(z=210 mm), overlaid on a standard template brain. The red circle is centered on the left VLPFC. Maps of t values were thresholded for illustration
purposes at p#0.05, uncorrected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015454.g005
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in attentional tasks the ventral network is mostly deactivated, with
the possible exception of VLPFC [61]. This parallelism lends
further plausibility to a role of VLPFC in response modulation
during spontaneous positive affective heuristics. Studies of the left
VLPFC are consistent with this interpretation, showing its
recruitment in working memory tasks even when typical executive
functions such as encoding and planning are not active [63], and in
semantic retrieval tasks, which may be involved in extracting
emotional meaning from contextual information [64]. Interestingly,
in a mediation analysis on deliberate emotion regulation, VLPFC
activity mediated regulation success [15]. This also points to the
hypothesis that this region has a special role in the regulation of
affective reactions – seemingly in spontaneous as well as in
deliberate emotion regulation.
As a whole, the modulation of activations and deactivations
associated with instructed and spontaneous avoidance suggests a
partial transfer of processing resources from a dorsal to a ventral
network of cortical areas. The relative recruitment of ventral areas
deactivated by the task during spontaneous avoidance is consistent
with current models of the function of the default mode network
emphasizing its role in spontaneous [58] or associative thinking
[65]. This finding is also consistent with previous observations of a
reciprocal interaction between dorsal and ventral networks
[60,66], and its modulation under the effect of emotional variables
such as stress or anxiety [67] or depression [59]. When not
instructed by or reporting to executive attentional processes, this
ventral system may give rise to response sets that appear to be
instantiated autonomously and be constitutive for mental health.
Materials and Methods
Recruitment and Behavioural Assessment
All participants were recruited through local announcements
and gave written informed consent. The study was conducted at
the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Ulm, Germany,
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was formally
approved by the Ethical Review Board of the University of Ulm.
All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were
right-handed German native speakers. Ongoing medical, neuro-
logical, or psychiatric disease (including depression), and current
use of psychotropic medication were excluded through an
individualized interview with an experienced clinician (R.V. or
P.B.). Depressiveness was assessed with a computerized German
Version of the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale
(CES-D, [68]; German Version: [69]). Participants with CES-D
scores larger than 24 (the cut-off for suspicion of clinical
depression) were excluded from the study. Working memory
capacity was measured outside the scanner with the operation
span test (OSPAN, [35], German version, [70]). There were 60
participants in the study (30 males), 30 per group, with age ranging
from 19 to 45 (mean age 25.2, standard deviation 5.8). Participants
were randomized to the groups after matching for sex, age, CES-D
and OSPAN scores to control for the influence of these variables.
Because individuals with a vulnerability to depression may use a
different strategy than other individuals to exclude negative
sentences [3], the match on CES-D scores was prioritized. As a
result, the spontaneous and the instructed groups did not differ in
sex (logistic regression, z=0.06), age (z=0.34, p=0.73), CES-D
(z=20.01) or OSPAN scores (z=0.31, p=0.76).
Scrambled Sentences Task
The scrambled sentences task was presented on two occasions:
before the scan, to collect data on cognitive bias comparable to
those of ref. [3], and during the scan. In both cases, a computer
interface was used to present the stimuli (Presentation 9.20,
Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA), but in the pre-scan
version participants wrote down the sentence on a sheet of paper.
After translation into German, the original 40 scrambled sentences
used by ref. [71] were presented in white lowercase letters on a
black computer screen in randomized order for three seconds in
each trial. A cross in the middle of the screen alerted them to the
appearance of the next stimulus. Participants had 12 seconds to
write down a grammatically correct sentence with five out of six
words, and had been instructed to work quickly, not to correct
mistakes, and to complete as many sentences as possible. As in
previous studies [3,71], sentences were presented in two blocks of
2.5 minutes each. The test score was computed as the ratio of the
negative to the total number of sentences formed.
In the scan version, the original task was modified in two
respects. First, to avoid the artefacts possibly produced by speaking
out loud or writing, participants were instructed to build the
sentences in mind and press a button to confirm that a sentence
had been formed. Scrambled sentences were presented through
goggles masking the whole field of vision (Resonance Technology
Inc., Northridge, CA). Time allowed to form sentences was
3 seconds per trial, previously determined as the 95% percentile of
button presses indicating completion of sentences in a preliminary
pilot study, resulting in 22 scrambled sentence presentations in
each 2.5 minutes-long block. This maintained a mild time pressure
on the completion of sentences, and kept participants focused on
the task during the block, making the block as homogenous as
possible as required by the perfusion design [72]. Second, the
material used to form sentences alternated between emotional and
neutral. There were four blocks in counterbalanced sequence to
neutralize order effects. As a check on the execution of the task,
after each block participants were presented with the possible
solutions to the sentences presented during the block and asked to
indicate the sentence they had built, if any. To keep the scanning
procedure within time limits, only 11 of the 22 sentences per block
were probed in this way. Instructed and spontaneous sentence
formation was varied between subjects as indicated in the
methodological discussion in ref. [30]. In the instructed group,
participants were asked to form positive sentence and avoid the
negative alternative in the emotional blocks. In the spontaneous
group, no mention was made of the existence of the emotional
blocks.
To characterize the emotional salience of the words used in the
task, a preliminary study was conducted on a separate sample of
19 student volunteers, recruited similarly to participants in the
study. Participants were asked to rate the words in the emotional
sets for arousal, using a standard visual analogue rating scale [73]
ranging from 1 to 9 (low to high arousal). One volunteer
completed only one third of the list, and was excluded from
analysis. The average arousal rating of all words was 6.1 (s.d. 0.55).
Positive words were rated with an arousal rating of 0.21 points less
than negative words (about 3.5% less). This small difference was
significant when tested in a repeated-measurements model [74]
with positiveness and words as fixed factors (F1,999=9.26,
p=0.002).
MRI Acquisition and Preprocessing
Data were collected at the Department of Psychiatry at the
University of Ulm, Germany. All magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) data were obtained with a 3-Tesla Magnetom Allegra
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) MRI system equipped with a head
volume coil. Images were individually screened to exclude
pathology. A continuous arterial spin-labelling technique [33]
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without labelling were acquired by using a gradient-echo echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR/TE: 4000/17, anterior-to-
posterior phase encoding, flip angle 90u, bandwidth 3005 Hz/
Pixel, field of view 22 cm). Image size was 64664615 voxels, slice
thickness 6 mm with a gap of 1.5 mm, giving a voxel size of
3.4463.4467.50 mm. The inversion plane was located 8 cm
below the central plane of the axial block of slices. A delay of 1 sec
was inserted between the end of the labelling pulse (2 sec) and
image acquisition to reduce transit artefacts. We made use of the
SPM2 package (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
London; online at http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) for realignment
and stereotactic normalization to an EPI template (Montreal
Neurological Institute, resampling size: 26262 mm). Reconstruc-
tion of cerebral blood flow (CBF) values was obtained using
software implementing equation (1) of ref. [33]. Volumes were
smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel of full width half
maximum (FWHM) 8 mm.
Statistical Analysis
The proportion of negative sentences, or the proportion of
sentences formed overall, was entered in a generalized linear
model (logistic regression) with age, sex, and OSPAN score as
explanatory variables. The model was fit with the freely available
statistical software R (version 2.9.2, The R Foundation for
Statistical Computing, www.r-project.org, Vienna, Austria), which
was also used for the tests of the previous section.
For the whole brain analysis, an explicit mask was obtained by
thresholding the a priori thresholded tissue probability maps
provided by the SPM package at 0.25 for gray or white matter.
The cerebellar region and the lower brainstem were excluded
manually in this mask because affected by large variances. All
corrections in the Results section are voxel-level (peak-level, strong
familywise error) corrections for the whole volume as defined by
this mask. Cluster-level corrections are reported in the tables of the
supplementary information available online. Significance values
for voxel and cluster level inferences were computed based on the
quantiles of the permutation distribution of the maximal t and of
the largest cluster of contiguous suprathreshold voxels, respectively
[76]. For cluster-level tests in the Supplementary Tables, clusters
were defined a priori by the uncorrected threshold p=0.005. In
each test, 20 000 permutations were computed. Computations
were carried out in MATLAB R2006b (The Mathworks, Natick,
MA) installed on a machine equipped with a 64-bit Athlon
processor (Advanced Micro Devices, Sunnyvale, CA) running
Windows XP (Microsoft, Redmond, WA). For the generation of
random numbers, the ‘MATLAB5 generator’ was used. Figures 1
and 2 were obtained by ‘fiducial mapping’ of the contrasts of
interest on an average of 12 healthy individuals landmark- and
surface-based atlas (PALS) using the freely available software
package Caret [77], version 5.615 (http://brainvis.wustl.edu/
wiki/index.php). The remaining figures are overlays of axial or
sagittal slice of a template brain, generated with the freely
available application MRIcroN [78], version beta 2 (http://www.
cabiatl.com/mricro/mricron/index.html).
Supporting Information
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